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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2A-10/28/82 
In the Matter of 
NORTH SYRACUSE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
CASE NO. C-2367 
-and-
NORTH SYRACUSE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner. 
BOND, SCHOENECK § KING, ESQS. (WILLIAM L. 
BERGAN, ESQ. and JOHN GAAL, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Employer 
MARY K. KASSMAN, for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of both the North Syracuse 
Education Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, the petitioner herein, and the 
North Syracuse Central School District, the employer herein, to a decision 
of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
defining a unit of those per diem substitutes, and only those per diem 
substitutes, who have received from the employer the reasonable assurance of 
continuing employment referred to in §201.7(d) of the Taylor Law. Both the 
petitioner and the employer question the appropriateness of the unit. Both 
also complain that they were denied a hearing and thus deprived of an 
opportunity to present evidence. The Association asserts that it could have 
shown that some per diem substitutes who did not receive an assurance of 
continuing employment should have been included in the unit, while the 
Board - C-2367 
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District asserts that it could have shown that some per diem substitutes who 
did receive that assurance should not have been included in the unit.— 
In its exceptions, the employer further argues that the Director erred 
in not disqualifying the petitioner from representing per diem substitutes. 
It advances two reasons in support of this argument. One is that the 
petitioner represents the regular teachers of the employer and that its 
certificationas li representative of ^>er diem substitutes would^^Therefore 
prejudice the employer in the event of a strike by regular teachers. The 
second is that the petitioner engaged in a strike of regular teachers in 
November 1976 and has thereby become ineligible for any new certifications. 
We first address the allegation that a hearing might have produced 
evidence establishing that some per diem substitutes who did not receive a 
reasonable assurance of continuing employment should have been included in 
the unit. We find that the evidence would not be material. 
Prior to July 27, 1981, "per diem" substitutes were not generally 
2/ deemed to be "employees" eligible for Taylor Law representation rights — 
The Taylor Law representation rights could be established only by proof of 
unusual circumstances involving a more than casual relationship between the 
3/ per diem substitutes and the school districts for which they worked.— 
T7 On April 13, 1982, we denied motions of both parties for permission to 
appeal the interlocutory ruling of the Director denying their requests 
for a hearing saying, "We cannot conclude that there is a sufficient 
likelihood that a hearing will be required." (15 PERB 1f3034 [1982]) 
2/ In Syracuse CSD (King), 6 PERB 1f3083 (1973); East Ramapo CSD, 6 PERB 
1[4033 (1973); Board of Education of the City School District of the 
City of New York, 10 PERB 114043 (1977), this Board and tne Director 
held, in several decisions, that the employment relationship of per 
diem substitutes to the school districts for which they worked was too 
casual to carry the right of representation. 
3/ Board of Education of the City School District of the City of Buffalo, 
13 PERB 113073 (1980). 
nm 
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The status of per diem substitutes who received a reasonable assurance of 
continuing employment changed on July 27, 1981, when the Taylor Law was 
amended— to provide that per diem substitute teachers whose employers 
give them a reasonable assurance of continuing employment are entitled to 
representation rights under the Taylor Law.— However, the status of the 
per diem substitutes who did not receive a reasonable assurance of 
continuing employment was not changed. No circumstances were alleged in the 
instant case which might indicate that the per diem substitutes of the 
District who did not receive a reasonable assurance of continuing employment 
had other than a casual relationship to the District. Thus, evidence on 
this point would not have been material. 
We now address the allegation that a hearing might have produced 
evidence establishing that not all per diem substitutes who received a 
reasonable assurance of continuing employment should have been placed in one 
unit. Under the amendment, all per diem substitutes who receive a 
reasonable assurance of continuing employment are entitled to representation 
rights. Thus, if the Director had excluded some of them from the 
negotiating unit, he would have been required to place them in another 
unit. Such fractionalized units of per diem substitutes on the basis sought 
by the District would not have been viable for collective negotiations. 
Moreover, if limited to per diem substitutes who worked infrequently or had 
not even worked at all after receiving the reasonable assurance referred to 
in the statute, the employees in such a unit would not be able to exercise 
TJ Chapter 814 of the Laws of 1981. 
5/ This amendment followed an amendment of §590.10 of the Labor Law, 
effective January 1, 1978, \tfhich disqualified for unemployment 
insurance benefits those teachers who received from their employer a 
reasonable assurance of continuing employment after a vacation period. 
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effectively the negotiating rights specifically accorded to them by the 
Legislature. Thus, evidence seeking to support two separate units would not 
have been material. 
The employer's contention that some per diem substitutes who received a 
reasonable assurance of continuing employment should not be in the same 
negotiating unit as other per diem substitutes who received the same 
assurance is not affected by the assurance of continuing employment given to 
some per diem substitutes by more than one school district. The Taylor Law 
amendment clearly provides that all substitute teachers who receive 
reasonable assurance of continuing employment from a school district are 
deemed employees of that school district and the legislative history of the 
amendment indicates that the authors of the legislation were aware that some 
of the substitute teachers received such an assurance from more than one 
school district.— The Director therefore correctly determined that a 
hearing could not have produced evidence requiring the fragmentation of the 
unit of per diem substitute teachers. Accordingly, we affirm his unit 
7/ determination.— 
Turning to the other issues raised by the employer's exceptions, we 
reject the argument that, by reason of the possibility of a strike, 
petitioner's representation of regular teachers disqualifies it from 
representing per diem substitutes. The issue here is not the unit 
determination, but the qualification of the Association to represent per 
67 The legislation was authored by the Temporary Subcommittee on Per Diem 
Substitute Teachers which had been created by Chapter 589 of the Laws 
of 1978. The minutes and correspondence of the subcommittee indicate 
that it saw no difficulty in the multiple representation of per diem 
substitute teachers who hold multiple substitute teaching positions. 
7/ See Bethpage Union Free School District, 15 PERB 1[3094 (1982). 
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diem substitutes. Sections 202 and 207.2 of the Taylor Law give to public 
employees the right to be represented by the employee organization of their 
choice. The statute does not limit this right where the organization 
represents more than one distinct group, one of which might strike in 
8/ 
support of the other.— 
Finally, we reject the employer's argument that petitioner must be 
disajjalified-for eer^ifieation-byreasonof its strike in 1976 The statute 
provides no basis for such sanction. Indeed, the legislative history of the 
9/ 
statute is contrary to the employer's position.— 
Section 207.3 of the Taylor Law does provide that as a condition for 
becoming the recognized or certified representative of a unit of public 
employees, an employee organization must affirm "that it does not assert the 
right to strike against any government, to assist or participate in such 
• strike, or to impose an obligation to conduct, assist or participate in such 
a strike." That affirmation has been made here and there is no reason to 
8/ In this, the Taylor Law must be contrasted with §9(b) of the National 
Labor Relations Act and New Jersey statute 34:13A-5.3, both of which 
reflect a statutory policy that unions which represent employees 
performing a particular type of work (guards under the NLRA, police 
under the New Jersey statute) be disqualified from representing other 
employees performing other types of work. * 
9/ The 1966 Taylor Law bill which passed in the Senate but not the 
Assembly included as a penalty for striking, 
revocation of the recognition or certification of such 
organization and forefeiture of the rights accompanying 
such certification or recognition, either indefinitely or 
for a specified period of time as the Board shall 
determine (CSL §210.3ff) as proposed by S.I. 4784, S.P. 
5689 of 1966). 
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doubt its good faith.— Section 210.3(f) of the Taylor Law itself 
indicates that a reasonable test of an employee organization's good faith 
acceptance of the strike prohibition is whether, after a strike, it has 
successfully negotiated a contract covering the employees in the unit 
affected by the violation without any further violation of the strike 
prohibition. In the present case, petitioner has negotiated three contracts 
"witlPthe employer ^ ihce^ "its" 1976 stHkenvith^ of 
§210.1 of the Taylor Law. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the exceptions herein be, and they hereby 
are, dismissed, and we refer this matter to the 
Director to conduct an election by mail ballot among 
per diem substitutes who received a reasonable 
assurance of continuing employment for the 1982-83 
school year as referenced in §201.7(d) of the Taylor 
Law unless the petitioner submits to the Director, 
within ten days from the date of receipt of this 
decision, evidence to satisfy the requirements of 
§201.9(g)(1) of the Rules of this Board for 
certification without an election. 
WE FURTHER ORDER the employer to submit to the Director 
and the petitioner, within ten days from the date of 
receipt of this decision, an alphabetized list of all 
per diem substitutes who have received a reasonable 
10/ Cf. State of New York (SUNY), 12 PERB 13092 (1979). 
itoy-
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assurance of continuing employment for the 1982-83 
school year as referenced in §201.7(d) of the Taylor 
Law. 
DATED: October 28, 1982 
Albany, New York 
^Z^S azyp^^^j,^ 
Harold Ri Newman/Chairman 
Ida KiTaus, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
, , . ,-,-, #2B-10/28/82 
In the Matter of 
HORSEHEADS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION and 
NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS, CASE NO. D-0227 
Upon the charge of a violation of 
Section 210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ. (ROCCO A. SOLIMANDO, ESQ. and 
GUNTER DULLY, ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
SAYLES, EVANS, BRAYTON, PALMER & TIFFT, ESQS., for 
Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by the chief legal officer of the 
Horseheads Central School District (District). It alleges that the 
Horseheads Teachers Association (Association) and NYSUT engaged in a strike 
in that they directed guidance counselors to refrain from work and condoned 
the ensuing work stoppage of the guidance counselors. The hearing officer 
determined NYSUT was not implicated in the strike. The determination with 
respect to NYSUT is not being questioned by the District and it is supported 
by the record. The hearing officer further determined that the Association 
condoned the strike, but did not call it. The Association has filed 
exceptions to this determination. 
The Association represents a unit of about 340 employees of the' 
District. Among these are five high school guidance counselors. For at 
least three years, the high school guidance counselors had participated in 
parent orientation meetings that were held on evenings shortly after the 
opening of the school year. 
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As of the opening of school in September 1981, the District and the 
Association had not yet reached an agreement to succeed one that had expired 
in June 1981. Dissatisfied with the progress of the negotiations, the 
guidance counselors questioned whether attendance at the orientation 
sessions was a part of their job description and they indicated to Bossong, 
the assistant principal of the high school, that they would consult with 
Rutenkroger, the Association's president, regarding their obligation to 
attend the sessions. Rutenkroger told Andrews, one of the high school 
guidance counselors, that participation in the parent orientation sessions 
was not required by the counselors' job descriptions. Andrews notified 
Bossong of the information that he received. Thereafter Bossong wrote to 
the guidance counselors directing each of them to attend one specified 
session. 
On September 22, Zaidel attended the orientation session to which 'slie 
was assigned, but Millard did not. Millard also absented himself from 
school that day. On September 24, Fudge and Andrews both stayed away from 
the orientation session to which they were assigned and absented themselves 
from school. On September 29, Franco stayed away from the orientation 
session to which he was assigned and absented himself from school. It is 
clear from the evidence that the absences of Millard, Fudge, Andrews and 
Franco constituted a strike. The only question is whether it can be found 
from the evidence that the Association bears any responsibility for that 
strike. We conclude that the evidence supports such a finding. 
.i/The Association argues that the hearing officer should have 
dismissed the charge because it was not brought "forthwith", having been 
filed 49 days after the strike. We consider the charge to have been brought 
with reasonable expedition. In this we contrast Local 2055, 15 PERB 1(3070 
(1982) in which we held that a charge brought more than 18 months after the 
strike was not timely. 
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Thus, while on several occasions between September 4 and 18 Rutenkroger 
urged the counselors not to be "insubordinate", this advice, which may or 
may not have referred to the contemplated strike, did not continue after 
September 18. Moreover, Rutenkroger did not make any effort to communicate 
with the counselors once the strike had begun even though he knew, by 
September 14, that the counselors were relying upon his incorrect advice to 
Andrews that their attendance at the parent orientation sessions was not 
required by the counselors' job descriptions. 
We affirm the hearing officer's conclusions that Rutenkroger condoned 
the strike and that his action is attributable to the Association. 
We turn next to the extent of the penalty to be imposed upon the 
striking employee organization (CSL §210.3[f][ii]) . We affirm the 
determination of the hearing officer on this record that the impact of the 
strike was _de minimis. We must consider also the degree to which the strike 
reflects a willful defiance of the Taylor Law prohibition of strikes (CSL 
§210.3 [f] [i]). We find that the absence of any reference in the guidance 
counselors' duty statements to attendance at after-school parent-teacher 
orientation meetings supports a conclusion that the guidance counselors did 
not believe that their decision not to attend the meetings would constitute 
a strike. Their subsequent action therefore reflected only a slight measure 
of willful defiance. 
The circumstances before us are therefore substantially the same as in 
Webutuck Teachers Association, 13 PERB 1(3041 (1980). In that case, we 
decided that the right of the striking association to the deduction of 
membership dues and to agency shop fee payments should not be suspended. We 
note here, however, as we did in Webutuck, that the impact of our decision 
".78C8 
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upon the Association is not insignificant. Our determination that it has 
struck in violation of the Taylor Law will be given significant 
consideration in the event that it strikes a second time. It is our 
practice to impose a more severe penalty upon employee organizations which 
strike a second time than we do for a first offense. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE DETERMINE that the Horseheads Teachers Association has 
: YiQ^^e^JJl^l :^ _0f_the_Taylor_Lawf_._ihat_the_imp_act_p_f.. 
the strike upon the health, safety and welfare of the 
community was _de minimis, and that the violation 
reflects only a slight willful defiance of the Law. 
WE ORDER that no forfeiture of dues checkoff or agency 
shop fee payments be imposed. 
DATED: October 28, 1982 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member. 
»
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2(3-10/28/82 
CASE NO. D-0187 
In the Matter of 
WYANDANCH TEACHERS ASSOCIATION 
Upon the Charge of Violation of 
Section 210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
Robert D. Clearfield, Esq., for Respondent 
Mart in L. Barr, Esq. (Richard A. Curreri, Esq., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
Packman, Oshrin and Block, Esqs. (Alan D. Oshrin, Esq., 
of Counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On March 6, 1980, Counsel to the Public Employment Relations Board 
charged the Wyandanch Teachers Association (Association) with violating 
§210.1 of the Taylor Law by engaging in a 41-day strike between September 17 
and November 16, 1979, against the Wyandanch Union Free School District 
(District). 
At the hearing which was held on July 1, 1980, January 27, 1981 and 
February 26, 1981, the Association conceded that it engaged in the 41-day 
strike as charged, but, as an affirmative defense, it alleged that its 
responsibility for the strike was diminished by acts of extreme provocation 
attributable to the District. The hearing officer concluded that the 
affirmative defense was not supported by the evidence.— The hearing 
1/ We determined at 15 PERB T3010 (1982) that the hearing officer did 
not give the Association sufficient opportunity to submit all its evidence 
in support of its allegation that its responsibility for the strike was 
diminished by acts of extreme provocation attributable to the District and 
we remanded the matter to her to take further evidence. After a second 
hearing, the hearing officer came to the same conclusion that she had 
reached after the first, that the evidence did not establish the allegation. 
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^ officer also concluded that the strike had a serious impact on the welfare 
of the community. In support of this conclusion, she found that all but 12 
or 13 of the 146 teachers of the District participated in the strike which 
prevented the District from conducting its usual education program. She 
also found that picketing teachers prevented vendors from delivering food 
and supplies to school buildings and, in the presence of students, they 
WfMlliyHabul^d^ublstituT 
No exceptions were filed to any of the findings of the hearing officer 
but the Association excepted to her determination that the Association's 
responsibility for the strike was not diminished by acts of extreme 
provocation attributable to the District. As to this point, the Association 
argues that the District engaged in a pattern of conduct during negotiations 
which establishes such extreme provocation. According to the Association, 
) the alleged circumstances which most clearly evidence such a pattern consist 
of the District's failure to give its negotiator sufficient authority to 
reach an agreement; the District's unwillingness to negotiate economic 
issues unless the Association would first capitulate to the District's 
position on the noneconomic issues; the District's attempt to intimidate the 
Association into withdrawing its chief negotiator; and the District's 
unilateral increase of the work year. The Association also contends that 
the District evidenced its intent to provoke a strike by making preparations 
for one before any strike was threatened. 
The hearing officer dealt with each of the Association's allegations. 
She found that the District's negotiator had been given sufficient authority 
to enter into an agreement within the parameters acceptable to the 
District. She also found that the District did not insist upon negotiating 
noneconomic issues before negotiating the Association's salary proposal. As 
Wi 7811 
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for the allegation that the District tried to intimidate the Association 
into removing its chief negotiator, the hearing officer found that, while 
there was personal antipathy between the chief negotiators, the District did 
not try to undermine the status of the Association's chief negotiator. The 
hearing officer found no basis in the record for concluding that the 
District's change in the school.calendarincreased the number of teacher 
. work days. Finally, the hearing officer was not persuaded by the 
Association's argument that the District's strike precautions evidenced its 
intention to provoke a strike. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm these findings of fact of the 
hearing officer. Accordingly, we agree that the evidence does not establish 
a pattern of extreme provocation by the District. 
It remains for us to determine the appropriate penalty to be assessed 
against the Association under the circumstances. We note that this was the 
first strike by the Association but that it was an unusually long one. 
Lasting 41 days, it is the second longest strike in the history of the 
Taylor Law. Throughout its duration, the strike had a serious impact upon 
the welfare of the community in that it curtailed the normal educational 
program of the District. However, there is no evidence that it had any 
impact upon the public health or the safety of the community. 
Until this time the longest dues checkoff forfeiture that we have 
imposed for a first strike involving teachers has been 15 months. That 
penalty was imposed upon the Levittown United Teachers for a strike of 34 
2/ days—' We determine that a longer penalty is appropriate here and that 
the Association should lose its dues deduction and agency shop fee 
J privileges for 18 months. 
2/ Levittown United Teachers~7 12 PERB 1[3043 (1979). There was no 
hearing in the Levittown case. The Levittown United Teachers withdrew its 
^\J * answer to the charge and agreed with the charging party to jointly recommend 
P? ^R"1^ a penalty of a dues deduction forfeiture of 15 months. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the dues deduction and agency shop fee 
privileges, if any, of the Wyandanch Teachers Association be forfeited 
commencing on the first practical date and continuing thereafter for a 
period of 18 months. Thereafter no dues or agency shop fees shall be 
deducted on its behalf until it affirms that it no longer asserts the right 
to strike against any government, as required by the provisions of CSL 
§210.3(g). 
If it becomes necessary to utilize the dues and agency shop fee 
deduction process for the purpose of paying the whole or any part of a fine 
imposed by order of a Court as a penalty in a contempt action arising out of 
the strike herein, the suspension of the dues and agency shop fee deduction 
privileges ordered hereby may be interrupted or postponed for such period as 
shall be sufficient to comply with such order of the Court, whereupon the 
suspension ordered hereby shall be resumed or initiated as the case may be. 
Dated: October 28, 1982 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Me; 
) 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//2D-10/28/82 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
, CASE NOv U-5758 
-and-
DONALD J. BARNETT, 
Charging Party. 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (JANIS LEVART BARQUIST, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
DONALD J. BARNETT, pro se, for Charging Party 
INTERIM BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by Donald J. Barnett, a member of the 
negotiating unit represented by the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, 
American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO (UFT), who pays an agency fee to 
UFT. The charge alleges that UFT coerces Barnett in the exercise of his 
right to refrain from joining that employee organization by giving to its 
members, but not to agency shop fee payers, free subscriptions to three 
union newspapers. Without taking any evidence, the hearing officer 
dismissed the charge saying: 
Although the printing and distribution of the union literature 
has a cost factor,. . . [i]t does not represent the type of 
benefit reasonably likely to influence a membership decision 
and, therefore, the restricted distribution does not itself 
violate the Act. 
»•. 7814 
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Filing exceptions to the hearing officer's report and recommendations, 
Barnett argues that the newspapers contain matters of substantial value to 
unit employees who receive them. He also argues that by using its general 
funds, part of which derives from agency shop fee payments, to pay for the 
printing and distribution of the newspapers, UFT is compelling agency shop 
fee payers to subsidize UFT members. 
We can neither affirm nor refute the hearing officer's conclusion that 
withholding of union newspapers from agency shop fee payers may be coercive 
without having a representative sampling of the newspapers before us—' 
Neither can we determine whether the financing of such printing and 
distribution of the newspapers out of the general funds of UFT, part of 
which comes from agency shop fee contributions, is coercive without 
information regarding the costs involved. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE REMAND this matter to the hearing officer to take 
appropriate evidence in accordance with this decision, and to issue a 
decision based upon such evidence. 
DATED: October 28, 1982 
Albany, New York 
ik^ /c£**<^ _— 
T7 The charging party submitted one copy of each of the three newspapers to 
the hearing officer, but the submission was without notice to UFT and 
cannot be considered by us as part of the record. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2E-10/28/82 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 2, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-6140 
-and-
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 
Charging Party. 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Bernard Schwartz to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
dismissing his charge. The charge alleges that the United Federation of 
Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) acted improperly in refusing to 
provide legal services to Schwartz who was challenging his dismissal from 
employment. 
Finding that the charge did not allege facts that might constitute a 
violation of the Taylor Law, the hearing officer assigned to the case wrote 
to Schwartz on three occasions for additional information.— Schwartz 
—' The improper practice charge form calls for the specification "in 
detail [of] the particular alleged violation, with a complete statement of 
the facts supporting the charge including names, dates, times, places, 
etc." The hearing officer's three letters to Schwartz told him that this 
requirement had not been met. In his second letter, the hearing officer 
invited Schwartz to telephone him if he had any questions about what details 
were required for the filing of a valid charge but Schwartz did not avail 
himself of this opportunity. 
•783.6 
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replied each time but none of his responses contained sufficient information 
to constitute an allegation of a Taylor Law violation by UFT. The 
additional information merely indicates that Schwartz complained about his 
dismissal by the "Board of Education" to a representative of UFT who 
informed him that UFT "supports" the action of the Board of Education. 
We are left to surmise that the employer is the City School District of 
the City of New York and that Schwartz was in a negotiating unit represented 
by UFT. Doing so, however, we find no alleged facts suggesting that UFT's 
decision to support the Board of Education was improperly motivated, grossly 
2/ 
negligent or irresponsible.— 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation, and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: October 28-, 1982 
Albany, New York 
we^_ £cjjy<*? Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida KlsriS,/Member 
2/See Brighton Transportation Association (Raz), 10 PERB 1[3090 (1977), 
in which we neid tnat a union commits an improper practice by refusing to 
represent a unit employee only if its decision to refuse such representation 
is "improperly motivated or so negligent or irresponsible as to constitute a 
breach of the duty of fair representation." 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
: //2F-10/28/82 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-6057 
-and-
FRED GREENBERG, 
Charging Party. 
FOARD $ ROSOFF, ESQS. (DAVID M. ROSOFF, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Fred Greenberg to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) dismissing his charge that the United Federation of Teachers, 
Local 2 (UFT) violated its duty of fair representation to him. The charge 
alleges that UFT discriminated against Greenberg by assigning Martin Gross to 
represent him at hearings of an unspecified nature despite his complaint that 
Gross had been unable or unwilling to represent him adequately in the 
past.!/ 
The hearing officer assigned to the case notified Greenberg on April 28, 
1982, that his charge was deficient "in that the facts as alleged do not 
appear to set forth a violation of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act." Greenberg asked for an opportunity to allege additional facts and was 
given two extensions of time during which to do so. On June 21, 1982, 
his attorney sent a photocopy of three documents to the hearing 
I/The hearing officer also dismissed other allegations of the charge 
but the exceptions do not deal with them, and they are not before us. 
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officer. None of these documents dealt with events that occurred before the 
charge was filed. 
The Director found that the allegations of fact did not establish a 
prima facie case and he dismissed the charge. 
Greenberg's exceptions refer to no allegations in the record. Having 
reviewed the record, we find no evidence to support a conclusion that UFT 
actedin"anlinlawfulT manner lfi^"respe^t~t6^~ts'lIuty~TOTrard~TunK 
Accordingly, we find no evidence to support a conclusion that the Director 
xras in error. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the Director, and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: October 28t 1982 
Albany, New York 
I 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
' •••••••,•• - •••:,•• //2G-10/28/82 
In the Matter of 
PROFESSIONAL STAFF CONGRESS/CUNY, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-5655 
-and-
MELVIN M. BELSKY and DAVID H. RAAB, 
Charging Partiesv 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (J. CHRISTOPHER MEAGHER, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
MELVIN M. BELSKY, pro se 
BOARD, .DECISION AND, ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Melvin M. Belsky to a 
hearing officer's determination that three specifications of a charge 
brought by himself and David H. Raab were not timely.— Belsky 
acknowledges that the actions of Professional Staff Congress/CUNY (PSC) 
complained about in the three specifications of the charge occurred more 
than four months prior to the filing of the charge, but he argues that our 
rules do not impose a four-month time limit on charges. Alternatively, he 
argues that the Taylor Law does not impose such a time limit and that 
JL/The hearing officer determined that other specifications of the 
charge were timely and he considered their merits, dismissing one and 
sustaining two others. No exceptions were filed to the hearing officer's 
disposition of the specifications of the charge which he considered on their 
merits and that disposition is not before us. 
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any attempt of this Board to do so in its rules is invalid. Finally, Belsky 
argues that if there is a proper four-month time limit, it was waived when 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation assigned the 
case to a hearing officer. 
We find no merit in any of Belsky's arguments. The Taylor Law does not 
specify any procedures for the prevention or remediation of improper 
practices"But-requires""ffiis-BolTd-to~^staT5'lTsh—slic^^r^Jce3ures ("S205T5Td]~~of~ 
the Taylor Law). Acting pursuant to that assignment, this Board promulgated 
rules establishing a four-month time limit for the bringing of a charge 
2/ (Rule 204.l[a][1])— and authorizing a respondent to raise the question of 
the timeliness of the charge as an affirmative defense (Rule 204.3 [c] [2]). 
PSC did so here, and the hearing officer found merit in the defense. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the exceptions herein be, and they 
hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: October 28, 1982 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Kl^ artis, Member 
—•-,.,,•,.. • i f , •/.. •—=u ^>r — • —f 
David C. Randies, Member / 
_2/Compare County of Nassau v. PERB, no official report (Sup. Ct. Nassau 
Co. 1981), 14 PERB 1(7023, in which the Supreme Court affirmed a decision of 
this Board dismissing exceptions to a hearing officer's decision because the 
exceptions were not filed within the time limits specified in our rules of 
procedure. 
L13K 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
^ #2H-.0/28/82 
In the Matter of 
ST. LAWRENCE-LEWIS COUNTY BOCES 
TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-5833 
-and-
DEBORAH L. BAKER, 
Charging Party. 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ. (IVOR R. MOSKOWITZ, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
DEBORAH L. BAKER, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by Deborah L. Baker, a former employee of 
St. Lawrence-Lewis County BOCES (BOCES) who, while so employed for the 
1980-81 school year, paid an agency shop fee to the St. Lawrence-Lewis 
County BOCES Teachers Association (Association). The charge alleges that 
the Association violated §209-a.2 of the Taylor Law in that it did not have 
a proper agency shop fee refund procedure and that it did not properly 
implement the procedure that it had. The hearing officer found merit in 
some specifications of her charge, but not in others, and the matter now 
comes to us on the exceptions of both Baker and the Association. 
Acting in accordance with the Association's procedures, Baker made a 
request in September 1980 for a refund of agency shop fees to be paid during 
the school year.then commencing. Those procedures provide no appellate 
steps for challenging the amount of the refund. Baker ceased to be an 
*>-. .7822 
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employee of BOCES in September 1981, after which she was not represented by 
the Association. 
On October 15, 1981, Baker received a check from the Association in the 
amount of $10 with a memorandum that explained that the check reflected only 
the Association's own refundable expenses and that an additional refund 
might be received from the Association's state and national affiliates. The 
refund from the Association was not accompanied "by any financial explanation 
of how it was calculated. 
Baker filed the charge on December 24, 1981. In it she complained both 
about the lack of financial information and the failure of the Association 
to refund a proportionate share of the monies that it sent to its 
affiliates. Four weeks thereafter, she received an agency shop refund from 
the affiliates, but it, too, was not accompanied by any financial 
information. A week later she received a letter from the Association 
telling her that financial information explaining the amounts of the refunds 
would be sent to her as soon as it was available. That information was sent 
a month later. 
Baker never amended her charge to complain that no requisite financial 
information accompanied the refund from the Association's affiliates. 
The hearing officer determined that the Association's failure to 
furnish financial information to Baker along with the $10 check on 
October 15, 1981, violated §209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Law. She rejected the 
allegation that the refund of the proportionate share of monies sent to the 
affiliates was so late as to constitute a violation. She also ruled that 
inasmuch as Baker never charged the Association with failing to provide 
financial information explaining the later refund, that inaction was not 
before her, and she did not find it to be a violation of the statute. 
* 7sm 
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In her exceptions, Baker argues that her charge was sufficient to 
encompass the entire amount of her agency shop fee payments. She asserts 
that since the Association is responsible for the entire refund even though 
part of it involves monies which it sent to its affiliates, her complaint 
that the refund procedure was inadequate is sufficient to address all 
aspects of the inadequacies. 
In its exceptions, the Association argues that its treatment of Baker 
did not violate the statute because, at the time of the refund, Baker was no 
longer a unit employee. Furthermore, whatever other agency shop refund 
obligations to Baker it may have had were satisfied in that it had made an 
appropriate refund and given her relevant financial data. A second basis 
for the Association's exceptions is that this Board's previously stated 
rationale for requiring financial information is irrelevant because the 
refund procedure contains no internal appellate steps. 
We find, as did the hearing officer, that the refund of a proportionate 
share of the monies sent by the Association to its affiliates was not late. 
Moreover, it was not improper for the Association to refund the 
proportionate share of the agency fee monies it retained without awaiting 
the refund of the share it sent to the affiliates. The validity of each of 
the two refunds must be judged separately and the allegation in the charge 
that the Association's refund was not accompanied by financial information 
cannot be read to anticipate a similar inadequacy with respect to the later 
refund. 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the hearing officer that the 
remedy for the Association's violation should be limited to that part of the 
agency shop fee which the Association did not forward to its affiliates. 
Board - U-5833 
^ The Association's contention that its obligations to Baker under 
§209-a.2 terminated with her loss of employment in September 1981 is 
rejected. We affirm the reasoning of the hearing officer that: 
Baker's right to pursue her 1980-81 refund request derives from 
her payment of agency shop fee for the year 1980-81. The fact 
that she later left public employment does not divest her of her 
rights under the Act to a legally adequate agency shop fee refund 
determination regarding deductions made during her public 
employment.
 : '_ 
Moreover, her right under the Taylor Law to receive an explanation of the 
amount of the refund at the time it is made was established when she paid 
the agency fee and requested the refund. Both of these events occurred when 
she was a unit employee. Her fundamental right to receive the explanation 
remained operative and was not extinguished simply because she left BOCES' 
employment. Thus, even though Baker was no longer a unit employee at the 
time the Association made the refund, the Association was required to 
fulfill the obligation it assumed at the time it accepted the agency shop 
fee and the employee requested the refund. 
We also note that the Association's failure to provide Baker with an 
explanation of the amount of her agency shop fee refund has a coercive 
effect upon the right of current unit employees to exercise their statutory 
right to refrain from joining the Association. They may reasonably fear that 
they too will receive no financial information if their employment is 
terminated after paying an agency shop fee but before receiving any refund. 
They might thus be deterred from seeking a refund or feel compelled to join 
the Association. 
Consequently, the failure of the Association to supply the necessary 
information to Baker undermined her rights under §202 of the Taylor Law. 
) 
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The Association's exception based upon the absence of appellate steps 
in the refund procedure is also rejected. We have already ruled that an 
employee's right to agency shop fee refund information is necessary to 
enable him to decide whether to exercise his right to challenge the amount 
of the refund in court. East Moriches Teachers Association, 14 PERB If3056 
(1981). 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the Association: 
1. to refund to Baker the amount of her agency fee 
deduction for 1980-81 which the Association did not 
forward to its affiliates less the sum refunded on 
October 15, 1981, with interest at the rate of nine (9) 
percent per annum from October 15, 1981, the date of 
receipt of refund determination, and 
2. at the time of making any other and future refunds, to 
furnish, together with those refunds, an itemized, 
audited statement of its receipts and disbursements, 
and those of any of its affiliates receiving any 
portion of its revenues from agency fees, such 
statement to indicate the basis of the determination of 
the amount of refund, including identification of those 
disbursements of the Association and its affiliates 
that are refundable and those that are not, and 
78?6 
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3. to post a notice in the form attached, at every 
facility at which any unit personnel are employed, on 
bulletin boards to which it has access by contract, 
practice or otherwise. 
DATED: October -28, 1982 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies', Member 
* -7, 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
EW YORK STATE 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT 
we hereby notify all unit employees that: 
1. The St. Lawrence-Lewis County BOCES Teachers Association will 
refund to Deborah L. Baker that portion of her agency shop fee 
deduction for 19 80-81 which was not forwarded to its affiliates, 
less the sum already refunded, with interest at the rate of nine 
(9) percent per annum from October 15, 1981. 
2. We will, at the time of making agency fee refunds, furnish together 
with those refunds an itemized, audited statement of our receipts 
. and disbursements, and those of any of our affiliates receiving 
any portion of their revenues from agency fees or dues, such 
statement to indicate the basis for the determination of the 
amount of refund, including identification of those disbursements 
of the St. Lawrence-Lewis County BOCES Teachers Association and 
its affiliates that are refundable and those that are not. 
ST. LAWRENCE-LEWIS COUNTY BOCES TEACHERS ASSOCIATION 
{Employee • Organization) 
Dated. By. 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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In the Matter of 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CITY OF NEWBURGH, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-5834 
-and-
LOCAL 589, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF FIRE FIGHTERS, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 589, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF FIRE FIGHTERS, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-5870 
-and-
CITY OF NEWBURGH, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 589, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF FIRE FIGHTERS, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-6013 
-and-
CITY OF NEWBURGH, 
Charging Party. 
WILLIAM KAVANAUGH, ESQ., for the City of Newburgh 
CRAIN AND RONES, ESQS. (JOSEPH P. RONES, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Local 589, International Association 
of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO 
?8?9 
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Local 589, International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO (Local 
589) represents firefighters employed by the City of Newburgh (City) and at 
all times relevant to the charges before us, Local 589 and the City were 
parties to a collective bargaining agreement. In May 1981, the City reduced 
the number of fire fighters per shift from twelve to eleven and Local 589 
requested negotiations on the impact of the reduction. Each of the three 
charges before us grew out of these circumstances. Dissatisfied with the 
City's negotiation posture, Local 589 both declared an impasse and charged 
the City with a refusal to negotiate in good faith (U-5834). The remaining 
two charges were filed by the City. They both allege that Local 589 acted 
improperly by declaring impasse: first, because there had not yet been 
sufficient negotiation for an impasse to have been reached (U-5870); and 
second, because the existing contract relieved the parties of any duty to 
submit to impasse procedures (U-6013). All three of the charges were 
decided against the City, and they come to us on its exceptions. The 
hearing officer had consolidated U-5834 and U-5870. We now consolidate 
U-6013 with the other cases for purposes of decision. 
FACTS 
Antedating the three charges, but relevant to them, is a fourth charge 
(U-5649) growing out of the same circumstances. It was that charge in which 
Local 589 first alleged that the City unilaterally reduced the number of 
fire fighters and refused to negotiate the impact of the reduction. The 
charge was withdrawn on October 15, 1981, pursuant to the parties' 
stipulation obligating the City to negotiate the impact of the shift 
reduction. The stipulation indicated that one of the subjects of 
negotiation would be whether or not an impact situation exists, with both 
parties agreeing to exchange pertinent information bearing upon this 
question. 7830 
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Thereafter, the parties held two brief meetings at which Local 589 
presented information and argument in support of its claim that the reduced 
manning level increased the workload of the remaining employees as well as 
the likelihood of injury to them. The City did not challenge Local 589's 
information or respond to its arguments. It merely stated that it was not 
persuaded that there had been any impact and refused to make any response to 
Local 5891s substantive proposals either by way of comment or proposals of 
its own. 
Without asking the City to meet with it further, Local 589 declared an 
impasse. At this point Local 589 also filed the charge in U-5834 
complaining about the City's unilateral reduction of manning levels and its 
refusal to negotiate the impact of that action. The City then filed the 
charge in U-5870 complaining that Local 589's declaration of impasse was 
premature. 
While the two charges were pending, the City filed its charge in U-6013 
in which it complained that Local 589 committed an improper practice by 
declaring an impasse because it and the City were parties to a still valid 
contract.— The Director of Public Employment Practices and Repre-
sentation (Director) dismissed this charge determining that the City's 
complaint in U-6013 merely repeated its complaint in U-5870. The City's 
exceptions argue that the two charges allege different causes of action, the 
first being that the declaration of impasse was premature and the second 
i/This charge also complained that PERB erred in that its Director of 
Conciliation assigned a mediator although there was no impasse. The 
Director dismissed this allegation of the charge, saying that an improper 
practice charge is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging PERB's 
authority to assign a mediator. The City did not file exceptions to this 
part of the Director's decision. Instead, it brought an Article 78 
proceeding to preclude mediation. The matter is still pending before the 
court. 
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being that the declaration of impasse was barred by the existence of an 
agreement. 
Dealing with U-5834 on its merits, the hearing officer found that the 
City refused to negotiate the impact of the decision, determining that the 
2/ City's conduct constituted surface bargaining.—' 
The City's exceptions to this decision first argue that the hearing 
officer-erredin finding--that-anallegation of surface^ bargaining was before 
her. They further argue that the City was free to deny that there was any 
impact and that it was not legally obliged to make a counterproposal. Thus, 
on the merits, it committed no wrong. 
Dealing with U-5870 the hearing officer dismissed the City's charge 
that Local 589 declared an impasse prematurely. In its exceptions, the City 
asserts, as it did in its exception to U-5870, that it was not obliged to 
make any proposals. On the basis of this assertion, it argues that its 
failure to make proposals during the two negotiating sessions could not 
justify Local 589's declaration of impasse. Echoing its charge in U-6013, 
the City also argues that Local 589*s declaration of impasse was improper 
because there was a valid contract between the parties. 
DISCUSSION 
U-6013 
We affirm the decision of the Director dismissing U-6013. In doing so, 
we do not reach the question whether he abused his discretion in dismissing 
the charge on the ground that it duplicated U-5870. We find that the charge 
2/The hearing officer also dismissed a specification of Local 589's 
charge which alleged that the City acted improperly by unilaterally reducing 
manning levels. She ruled that such a reduction is not a mandatory subject 
of negotiation. No exceptions were filed to this part of her decision. 
?832 
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in U-6013 is not sufficient in any event. In settling U-5649, the City 
assumed an obligation to negotiate the impact of its reduction in force. 
Thus, even if there was a basic contract between the parties whose terms 
would have relieved the City of an obligation to negotiate the impact of its 
3/ 
reduction of forces,— the City, by its subsequent agreement to negotiate, 
waived its right to stand on that contract. 
We reject the C i ty's further"argument that a duty tcT negotiate during 
the life of a contract does not carry with it the duty to submit to impasse 
procedures. To the contrary, we conclude that the impasse procedures 
specified in §209 of the Taylor Law apply wherever there is a statutory 
obligation to negotiate and the parties fail to reach an agreement. This 
conclusion is dictated by the public policy underlying the Taylor Law which, 
in an effort to foster harmonious and cooperative relations in the public 
sector, and to avoid strikes, both requires public employers to negotiate 
with the organizations representing their employees and directs this Board 
to assist in the resolution of negotiation disputes. 
U-5834 
We reject the City's argument that it committed no wrong because it was 
entitled to deny the existence of any impact and was not obliged to make a 
counterproposal to Local 589. That argument is based upon a misreading of 
Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga BOCES, 15 PERB 13036 (1982). In Schuyler-Chemung-
Tioga BOCES, the employer listened to the union's presentation with an open 
mind, engaged in "considerable discussion" regarding the union's 
3/The charge does not allege that any provision of the parties' basic 
contract constitutes an express waiver of the union's right to negotiate 
impact. 
^83: 
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presentation and even explored certain compromises. Here, the City listened 
to Local 589's presentation at the two negotiating sessions but refused to 
engage in any meaningful discussions and was unwilling to explore the 
possibility of any compromise. According to the hearing officer, the City's 
conduct reflected the absence of a sincere desire to reach an agreement. We 
agree. This conduct, and the attitude it represents, constitutes a refusal 
M-to negotiate in violation of §209-a.l(<i) of the Taylor Xaw 
U-5870 
We affirm the hearing officer's decision dismissing the allegation that 
Local 589 declared impasse prematurely. The City's refusal to negotiate in 
good faith created an impasse under the Taylor Law, that is, a situation in 
which there was no reasonable expectation that further negotiations would be 
fruitful without third-party assistance.— Certainly, as noted by the 
hearing officer, the City cannot be heard to deny the existence of an 
impasse on the ground that there were insufficient prior negotiations when 
its own conduct precluded meaningful negotiations. 
i/The hearing officer characterized the City's conduct as "surface 
bargaining" which has led to the City's argument that the charge did not 
specifically allege "surface bargaining". 
^.'Notwithstanding the existence of an impasse, this Board may withhold 
third-party assistance from the party seeking it when the improper conduct 
of that party is responsible for the impasse. Haverstraw, 9 PERB 1[3063 
(1976), Binghamton Fire Fighters, 9 PERB 13072 (1976). On the other hand, 
even the innocent party may not refuse to participate in negotiations before 
a mediator appointed by this Board's Director of Conciliation. Uniformed 
Fire Fighters Association of Mt. Vernon, 11 PERB 1[3095 (1978). A fortiori, 
the City, having improperly refused to negotiate in good faith, cannot now 
refuse to participate in negotiations before a mediator. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the exceptions herein be, and they 
hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: October 28, 1982 
Albany, New York 
larold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus •-Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//3A-10/28/82 
In the Matter of 
TOMPKINS-CORTLAND COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Employer-Petitioner, 
-and-
TOMPKINS-CORTLAND COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
TEACHERS, LIBRARIANS AND COUNSELORS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
Case No. C-2482 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules 
of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Tompkins-Cortland Community 
College Teachers, Librarians and Counselors Association has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and regular part-time 
teaching faculty; librarians; 
counselors; T.A. Biology Lab (ETS); 
Admissions Officer; T.A. Math Lab 
(ETS); T.A. Nursing Lab (NAH); T.A. 
Media Engineer (LRC); T.A. Accounting 
Lab (BPS); Placement § Transfer 
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Coordinator; T.A. Media Specialist 
(LRC); T.A. Reading Lab (LAH); T.A. 
Media Services (LRC); T.A. 
Secretarial Science Lab (BPS); T.A. 
Writing Lab (LAH); T.A. Graphics 
Artist (LL). 
Excluded: All other employees of the employer, 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Tompkins-Cortland Community 
College Teachers, Librarians and Counselors Association and enter 
into a written agreement with such employee organization with 
regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall negotiate 
collectively with such employee organization in the determination 
of, and administration of, grievances. 
DATED: October 27, 1982 
Albany, New York 
Jeit*-&e*P/&. ^^ /-Ttc^^i, 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
/d4u*o^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Membe] 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//3B-10/28/82 
In the Matter of 
BROADALBIN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner. 
Case No. C-2500 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees* Fair Employment Act and the Rules 
of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees" Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time non-
instructional employees. 
Excluded: Bus Drivers, Secretary to the 
Superintendent, and Head Mechanic 
(Acting Bus Garage Manager). 7838 
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Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil ServiceEmployees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and enter into a 
written agreement with such employee organization with regard to 
terms and conditions of employment, and shall negotiate 
collectively with such employee organization in the determination 
of, and administration of, grievances. 
DATED: October 27, 1982 
Albany, New York 
- g ^ x ^ . ^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
d&*~ fdt^A**-' 
Ida Klaus, Member 
%J<^k^t/. 
David C. Randies, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF ISLIP, 
Employer, 
-and-
TOWN OF ISLIP EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
p
 e tl tTone f 7 
-and-
LOCAL 23 7, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, 
I n t e r v e n o r . 
//3C-10/28/82 
Case No. C-2451 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules 
of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 237, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: 
Excluded 
All employees in the existing Town of 
Islip blue collar unit as set forth in 
the attached schedule. 
All other employees, including elected 
or appointed officials, department heads 
and deputies, designated confidential 
employees, part-time employees, seasonal 
employees, and temporary employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 237, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters and enter into a written agreement with 
such employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of, and administration of, 
grievances. 
DATED: October 27, 1982 
Albany, New York 
4**fei£^£w~ T/t^TX^t^h^. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
e^-4^ /Utt-juut^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies 
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TOWN OF ISLIP BLUE COLLAR EMPLOYEES 
Laborer 
Custodial Worker I 
Sanitation Helper 
Guard 
Groundskeeper I 
L__ Kennel Attendant—— -——:- — 
Automotive Equipment Operator 
Groundskeeper II 
Custodial Worker II 
Automotive Mechanic I 
Warehouse Worker II 
Weighmaster -
Maintenance Mechanic I 
Driver Messenger 
Habor Manager I 
Material•Control Clerk I 
Dispatcher 
Guard It 
Maintenance Mechanic II 
Guard III 
Painter I" 
Dog Warden 
Water Meter Reader 
Water Meter Repairer 
Airport Security Officer 
Material Control Clerk II 
Sign Painter I 
Automotive Equipment Operator II 
Harbor Manager II 
Automotive Mechanic II 
Heavy Equipment Operator 
Automotive Mechanic III 
Material Control Clerk. Ill 
Airport Fire Safety Officer 
Maintenance Mechanic III 
Waterways Maintenance Mechanic II 
Airport Maintenance Mechanic III 
Senior Water Meter Reader 
Senior Water Meter Collector 
Construction Equipment Operator- ~ 
Sewerage Treatment Plant Operator 
Tree Trimmer I 
Auto Mechanic III (Diesel) 
Pump Operator (#2 License) 
Labor Crew Leader 
Highway Labor Crew Leader 
Harbor Manager III 
Groundskeeper II 
Sr. Airport Security Officer 
Custodial Worker III 
Senior Guard 
Senior Dog Warden 
Sign Painter II 
Sr. Airport Fire Safety Officer 
Maintenance Mechanic IV 
Automotive Mechanic IV 
Sanitationer III 
Waterways Maintenance Mechanic III 
Sewerage Treatment Plant Operator 
(Type B) 
Incinerator Plant Manager 
Water District Maintenance 
Crew Leader 
Town Building Maintenance Crew 
Leader 
Tree Trimmer II 
Automotive Mechanic IV (Diesel) 
Highway Labor Crew Leader 
Incinerator Plant Supervisor 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//3D-10/28/82 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SEWANHAKA CENTRAL 
HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
•^ E-WftN-HAKA-SeH^ O-Ir-EMFteY-BE-SH^ SeeMTl-GN-,------
Petitioner, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules 
of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Sewanhaka School Employees 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above named public employer, in the unit 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
7843 
Case No. C-2392 
Certification - C-2392 page 2 
Unit Included: All clerical personnel and approved civil 
service support personnel that may 
include, but is not limited to, library 
aides, laboratory assistants, monitors and 
audio-visual helpers; exclusive of casual 
employees and employees designated' as 
managerial or confidential under 
provisions of the Civil Service Law. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Sewanhaka School Employees 
Association and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment, 
and shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization 
in the determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
DATED: October 27, 1982 
Albany, New York 
t&jp-yH.^/h 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
c*%«u /C£JL4«~4*S 
Ida K l a u s , Member 
David C. R a n d i e s , Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MOHONASEN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
MOHONASEN TEACHERS ASSOCIATION 
#3840 , NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, _ 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
//3E-10/28/82 
Case No. C-2446 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules 
of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Mohonasen Teachers 
Association #3840, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Substitute teachers who have received 
the reasonable assurance of continuing 
employment in accordance with sub-
division 10 of section 590 of the 
labor law which is sufficient to dis-
qualify the substitute teacher from 
receiving unemployment insurance 
benefits. 
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Excluded: All other employees. 
.Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Mohonasen Teachers 
Association #3840, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO and enter into a written 
agreement with such employee organization with regard to terms and 
conditions of employment, and shall negotiate collectively with 
such employee organization in the determination of, and 
administration of, grievances. 
DATED: October 27, 1982 
Albany, New York 
^ • Stfg«t?2*^t 
I Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
^U- /dUj^_. 
Ida Kiaus, Member 
David C. Randies , Menroer 
*7 M.6 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
NOTICE OF PROPOSED AGENCY ACTION 
Pursuant to the provisions of the State Administrative Procedure Act, 
NOTICE is hereby given of the following proposed agency action: 
1. Proposed action: 
Amendment of Board Rules 4 NYCRR Chapter VII Part 201 • 
"2"." ~St~atTflT6ry~autliorlLT:y~"!In3^ ^ acti"onr~is"prop6se3': 
Article 14 of the Civil Service Law 
3. Subject of the proposed action: ' 
Relettering of subdivision (b) of Rule §201.2 to be subdivision (c)," 
adding a new subdivision, (b). Amending title of Rule §201.5 and 
adding.a new subdivision (c) to such section. 
4. Purpose of the proposed action: 
To permit the filing of a certification petition with respect to 
newly created or altered positions so as to ascertain, the proper 
bargaining unit placement of such position. 
5. Terms of the proposed action: 
The proposed rule, amendment, suspension, or repeal contains 2,000 
words or less. The original ribbon copy of the express terms of the 
proposed action is a part of this notice and is attached to this 
form. The typing for the express terms conforms to the instructions 
presented in section 260.2 of Title 19 of the Official Compilation of 
•Codes $ Rules and Regulations of the State of New York. 
6. The express terms of proposed action may be.obtained from: 
Name of agency, representative: Jerome Lefkowitz, Deputy Chairman 
Office address: New York State Public Employment Relations 
Board 
50 Wolf Road, Albany, NY 12205 
Telephone number: (518) 457-2614 
7• Regulatory impact statement: ' 
A regulatory impact statement of 2,000 words or less is submitted with 
this notice. 
-2-
) 8. A public hearing is not required by law, and a public hearing has not 
been scheduled. 
9. Data, views or arguments may be submitted to: 
Name of agency representative: Jerome Lefkowitz, Deputy Chairman 
Office address: New York State Public Employment 
Relations Board 
50 Wolf Road, Albany, NY 12205 
Telephone number: (518) 457-2614 
10. Additional matter required by statute: 
Not applicable _ 
I have reviewed this form.and the information submitted with it. The 
information contained in this notice is correct to the best of my knowledge. 
I have reviewed article 2 of the State Administrative Procedure Act 
and Parts '260, 261, 262 and 263 of Title 19 of the Official Compilation of 
Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York, and I hereby 
certify that this notice complies with all applicable provisions. 
This notice was prepared by: ---fp^^u^/j-^^A. - A&i^~7t<^^y^K^ 
• Name: Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Address: • New York.State Public Employment Relations 
Board 
50 Wolf Road, Albany, NY 12205 
Telephone: (518) 457-2578 
Dated: November 29, 1982 
REGULATORY IMPACT STATEMENT 
'^  
The current rules permit the filing of. a certification 
petition during the challenge period set forth in 4 NYCRR Section 201.3. 
However, they make no provision for addressing the situation resulting 
"fronf-th~e cr'eatioif or reclassification of positions not covered by a 
prior public employer's recognition or a certification order by the 
agency. Conceivably, therefore, a period, of years may elapse during 
which incumbents of newly created or reclassified positions are deprived 
of the rights granted to public employees by Article 14 of the Civil 
) • ' • . ' . " 
Service Lav; merely because current agency rules do not provide a mech-
anism for addressing the problem. While the need sought to be address-
ed is not, with respect to any particular public employer, very large, 
it does on an accumulative basis represent a cognizable irritant to the 
smooth and effective implementation of Article 14 of the Civil Service 
Law. The proposed rule provides a mechanism for addressing this problem. 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: Civil Service Law Article 14, Section 205.5 
RELATIONSHIP WITH STATE AND FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS: None 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS: None 
\ • ' ' 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: The proposed agency action will have no impact on 
the state economy and will not increase the cost to (a) state government, 
(b) local governments, (c) regulated parties, or (d) the general public. 
-VI-AB-L-E—A-LTE-RNAT-I-ATE-: — -No-fte— - — :—-—;:—1 
CONTACT PERSON: • Jerome Lefkowit^, Deputy Chairman, New York State Public 
Employment Relations Board, 50 Wolf Road, 5th Floor, Albany, New York, 
12205, (518) 457-2614. 
' \ . . • . • • . • ' • • 
) .. . . 
Section 201.2 of the Rules of the Public Employment 
Relations Board (4 NYCRR, Chapter VII) is hereby amended by reletter-
ing subdivision (b) to be subdivision (c) and by adding thereto a new 
subdivision to be subdivision (b) to read as follows 
; 
(b) Notwithstanding sections 201.3 and 201.4 of these 
Rules, a petition may be filed by a public employer or a recognized or 
certified employee organization to clarify whether a new or substant- ' 
ially altered position is encompassed within the scope of an existing 
unit, or to determine the unit placement of a new or substantially 
; • . . . . • 
altered position:. The filing and processing of the petition shall be 
in accordance with sections 201.5 (c) , 201.7 (a) and (d) , 201.8, 201.9 
(a)-(f), and 201.11 of these Rules. In determining the unit placement 
of any new or substantially altered position, the Director shall con-
sider whether the placement would be consistent with the criteria set 
forth in section 207 of the Act. The Director may decline to make 
any clarification or placement not otherwise consistent with the pur-
poses or policies of the Act. Exceptions to any determination of the 
\ Director may be filed pursuant to section 2 0 1.12 of these Rules. 
The title of Section 201.5 of such Rules is hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
Contents of Petition for Certification; Contents of 
Petition for Decertification; Contents of Petition to Clarify Existing 
Unit or to Determine Unit Placement of New or Substantially Altered 
Positions. 
Section 201.5 of such Rules is hereby amended by adding 
thereto a new subdivision (c) to read as follows: 
(c)- Petitions filed pursuant-to section 201.2(b) shall 
contain the following: 
(1) The name, affiliation, if any, and address of the 
recognized or certified employee organization. 
(2) The name and address of the public employer involved. 
(3) A description of any affected existing negotiating 
unit, a copy of any applicable certification or recognition, and the 
date thereof. 
(4) The number of employees in the existing unit and in 
the unit proposed in the petition. 
(5) The job description and classification of each new 
or substantially altered position and the date of its establishment. 
(6) The name and address of any other employee organiza-
tion which claims to represent the new or substantially altered posit-
/ " • _ • • ' • 
i o n . . . 
<, ' (7) A copy of any contract affecting the new or substan-
tially altered position. 
(8). A statement by the petitioner setting forth the 
details of the desired clarification or placement and the reasons 
therefor. 
